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1 ‘If a cause be defined, that which produces anything; it is easy to observe, that producing
is synonymous to causing’ (David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edn., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), VIII. ii. 96 n.)
The context makes it plain that this is regarded as unsatisfactory.
2 F. Ramsey, ‘General propositions and causality’, in D. H. Mellor (ed.), Foundations: Essays in
Logic, Mathematics and Economics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 133–51, at
p. 136. Ramsey applies the phrase to ‘variable hypotheticals’, sentences like ‘All men are mortal’.
He argues that laws are special cases of such hypotheticals.
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A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it,
that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
This is standardly called Hume’s second definition of causation. So con-
strued, it gives rise to familiar problems. As a definition of causation it is cir-
cular, for ‘determines’ is a synonym for ‘causes’. Given that Hume himself
criticizes using synonyms in attempts to define causation,1 it would be odd
if he were to engage in the practice himself. It is also visibly not equivalent
to the first definition, which makes no mention of minds.
These worries disappear if we treat it not as a definition of causation, but
rather as a definition of what it is to believe in causation: for short, as a def-
inition of causal belief. One way to make this explicit, guided by Ramsey’s
phrase ‘a habit of singular belief’,2 is as follows:
S implicitly believes that Fs cause Gs iff S is in the grip of an F–G
regularity; i.e.
(i) coming to believe an F has occurred causes S to believe that a G will
occur nearby and later;
(ii) coming to believe that a G has occurred causes S to believe that an F
has occurred nearby and earlier.
Although this is not equivalent to the first definition, equivalence is no
longer to be expected, for one would not suppose that causation and causal
belief are the same thing; there can be unsuspected causes and false causal
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beliefs. Moreover, relative to the ambition of defining causal belief, the
definition is not circular, for the concept of causal belief does not occur in it:
although the concept of causation is used, it is not used within the belief
context. The definition could therefore be useful to someone who under-
stands causation but needs an account of the kind of psychological state a
person is in if they believe some causal generalization.
The definition is not the same as Hume’s second definition, for I have made
no attempt to do justice to Hume’s first phrase (‘an object precedent and con-
tiguous to another’), which may perhaps be a condensed repetition of the first
definition. Perhaps, in this context, ‘an object’ means ‘a kind of object’; and
precedence and contiguity between kinds of objects are naturally understood
as entailing the constant conjunction of all objects falling under the kinds.
On this interpretation of the second definition, the first and second
definitions would not only be definitions of different things, they would also
differ in another way. Whereas the first definition, in my opinion, defines
singular causation (in terms of the particular cause and its effect being
subsumed under a regularity), the second definition addresses not belief in
singular causation but belief in causal generalization. I will not defend my
exegetical claims (which are far from idiosyncratic), for the main theme of
the present paper is a question which is of interest even if the exegesis is
defective: can a definition of belief in a causal generalization differentiate it
from belief in a non-causal generalization? Before approaching this directly,
the next section sets some background, including the notion of implicit as
opposed to explicit belief.
II
The beauty of the second definition, under this construal, is that it explains
causal belief as something not requiring belief in a causal content, and this
makes room for various reductive or eliminative options for Humeans
(see section III below). It also makes causal belief something that could
be possessed by creatures lacking the concept of causation. Let us call a
belief concerning the unexperienced ‘inductive’. It is beyond doubt that
Hume thought it important to point out that non-human animals have
inductive beliefs (despite not being capable of argumentation), and that such
beliefs normally arise only through the experience of constant conjunction.
According to the present account of the second definition, it would follow
that any creature with a normally produced inductive belief has a causal
belief, that is, implicitly believes something of the form Fs cause Gs. This is
indeed what we find Hume claiming:
they [sc. non-human animals] become acquainted with the more obvious proper-
ties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge
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of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects,
which result from their operation. (Enquiry, 105)
The final phrase, about ‘the effects, which result from their operation’, shows
that the knowledge of fire, water, and so on includes causal knowledge. In
the light of this context, we can read Hume as attributing causal knowledge
to the old and canny greyhound who ‘meets the hare in her doubles’: the
dog’s ‘conjectures’ are that being chased one way by the younger dogs will,
given the lie of the land, drive the hare back this way.
Even those sympathetic with an account of causal belief which would
make it correctly attributable to creatures lacking the concept of causation
may feel that we should distinguish between that way of having a causal
belief and a way of having such a belief available only to a creature who
does employ the concept of causation. For example, it might be held that we
need to employ the concept if we are going to make use of Hume’s ‘rules to
judge of causes and effects’, and so entertain causal generalizations merely
hypothetically. This requires an account of a causal generalization being
before the mind without being believed. If evidence then leads to belief, this
is explicit belief, apparently involving a relation to a causal content. It was
in deference to this view that I took the definiendum of the second definition
to be implicit causal belief. But what is implicit belief?
An explicit belief involves, at least superficially, a relation between a
believer and a content. Being in a state of believing a content generally makes
a difference to dispositions to act. This enables us to indicate the schema of
a definition of implicit belief:
S implicitly believes that p iff S has dispositions characteristic of explicit
belief that p.
This is only a schema, for it does not specify the relevant ‘characteristic’
dispositions. Not all can be involved, as some of these are dispositions
to exercise the concept of causation. The schema ensures that explicitly
believing that p entails implicitly believing that p, but not vice versa.
Those unpersuaded by the explicit–implicit distinction can just set it to
one side.
III
If one has a definition of causation, why would one need an additional def-
inition of causal belief? If p is defined as q, then surely the belief that p just
is the belief that q?
This assumes that definition induces a relation which permits substitution
salva veritate even in hyperintensional contexts. It is reasonable to suppose,
however, that this is not how Hume thought of his first definition—that is,
his definition of causation—for he thought that this deflated the ordinary
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conception. In causal belief we aspire to believe not just that things are
constantly conjoined, but that they are also necessarily connected. Since we
tend not to have the right view even of what we are aspiring to in exercising
the concept of causation, it would be incorrect merely to equate our causal
beliefs with beliefs in constant conjunctions.
The considerations which follow are supposed to apply, with appropri-
ate adjustments, regardless of the precise version of Humeanism adopted.
However, the presentation requires a definite version, one which settles,
for example, whether causation is to be reduced to constant conjunction,
so that it is something real and potentially knowable, or whether it is to be
eliminated in favour of constant conjunction, so that there is no intelli-
gible concept of causation, constant conjunction being merely the closest
intelligible approximation. The version I will discuss in detail is a form of
reductionism: the content of a general causal proposition is the same as
that of a proposition affirming constant conjunction among kinds of
events, along with priority and contiguity in the pairings of tokens of the
kinds. Causation is thus a perfectly genuine, real, and knowable phenom-
enon, and is so even for Hume, provided that we do not read him as
sceptically denying that we possess inductive knowledge. (I think the
non-sceptical reading is correct, and it is supported by what I have already
quoted of Hume’s view of the inductive knowledge which non-human
animals possess.) When a generalization involves a causal idiom, however,
it can be believed in a different way from the way in which the same
proposition, or a proposition of the same kind, can be believed when
expressed in a causal-free idiom. This difference in mode of belief is easily
confused with a difference in content believed, thus giving rise to the wide-
spread myth that causation is something more than constant conjunction.
We generally fail to recognize that a general causal fact is just a fact of
constant conjunction (plus priority and contiguity). This is why the second
definition is important: it describes the mode of belief, being in the grip of
a regularity, which constitutes a special way of believing in a constant
conjunction, a way which makes us wrongly think we are believing in
some kind of necessity in the world. The projectivist confusion could be
expressed as the move from
believing something to be an F caused the belief that it is a G
to
its being an F made it a G (by a necessary connection).
The issues on which we are about to embark have an interest beyond the
exegesis of Hume. For example, some versions of functionalism, the thesis
that each mental state is individuated by its location in a causal network of
other states, could use something along the lines of the second definition.
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We cannot expect to be able to define what it is implicitly to believe
arbitrary kinds of content in the way proposed for causation. For example,
the following are dubious:
(i) S implicitly believes that not-p iff it is not the case that S believes
that p.
(ii) S implicitly believes that a is F iff, concerning a, S believes that it is F.
(iii) S implicitly believes that something is F iff there is something which
S believes to be F.
(iv) S implicitly believes that (p or q) iff (S believes that p) or (S believes
that q).
(v) S implicitly believes that (p because q) iff (S believes that p) because
(S believes that q).
Since we can be agnostic, we can fail to believe p without believing not-p.
Non-conceptual creatures might exemplify the equivalence in (ii), but accord-
ing to Fregeans a conceptual creature could believe of Hesperus that it is
visible in the morning without believing that Hesperus is visible in the
morning. Unless intuitionist norms are invariably adhered to, there are cases
in which one believes that something is F without believing of anything in
particular that it is F; the point carries over to disjunction. The final case,
(v), is close to our official target. The most obvious counterexamples are
ones which involve causal connections between things neither of which is
the cause of the other. For example, I may believe that the toast is done
because I believe it is emitting a certain smell, but the proposition ‘The toast
is done because it is emitting a certain smell’, understood as an identification
of a cause, is not one which I accept: smell emission does not cause done-
ness. In such cases there is a causal connection (the heat that caused the
doneness caused the smell), even if it is not one which sustains the applica-
tion of ‘because’. As I will elaborate at the start of section IV, I will not press
Hume’s account to adapt to the distinction between causal connection and
causation.
A causal belief is a belief with causal content; but on the version of
Humeanism adopted here, a belief with causal content is a belief with
merely a certain kind of constant conjunction as its content. What makes
some such beliefs special is the mode of believing, not the content believed.
We can also have beliefs about beliefs: we believe we have beliefs with a con-
tent involving not merely causation (that is, on the present formulation,
constant conjunction) but also necessary connection, which is unintelligible.
These second-order beliefs do have a distinctive content: namely, the special
mode of causally believing. The distinction can easily be slid over, and this
is just what we find in Hume: the ‘idea of necessary connection’ is some-
times explained in terms of the determination mentioned in the second
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definition, and sometimes in terms of awareness of that determination (an
awareness not mentioned in the second definition). The present formulation
equates what is distinctive in causal belief with the determination, and this
may become a distinctive content for a second-order belief, one involving
awareness of the determination.
IV
The main questions of the paper can now be expressed as follows: is there a
distinctive way of believing a generalization which has this feature: when we
believe a generalization in this way, we (wrongly, in Hume’s view) take our-
selves to be believing something which involves necessity? If so, does being
in the grip of a regularity constitute that mode of belief? We do not need to
raise more familiar questions, like whether there are counterexamples to the
reduction of causation to constant conjunction. Counterexamples are likely
to be allegedly non-causal constant conjunctions. But it might be that if
they are believed in the special way, then they are, wrongly even by the lights
of those who allow necessity, treated as necessity-involving. So our present
question has some independence from questions about the correctness of
Hume’s first definition.
In the present formulation, the Humean is committed to the possibility
of at least two ways of believing a constant conjunction: a way distinctive
of causal belief and some other way. This is because, as I assume, there are
generalizations which are merely ‘accidental’ and are not believed in the
causal way and are not supposed to correspond to any causal fact: for
example, ‘All the coins in my pocket are silver’. This is consistent with the
reduction of causation to constant conjunction, for the reduction identifies
only a specific kind of generalization with causation: generalizations
quantifying over specified kinds of events and affirming priority and
contiguity of the pairings of the tokens. However, there are complications
in saying in more detail just what a Humean could reasonably take as
her aim.
The second definition does not speak directly to the mode of belief distinct-
ive of belief in a singular causal statement. According to the first definition,
a singular causal statement is true only if some regularity subsumes it, but
because no regularity is entailed, belief in the singular causal statement intu-
itively requires only belief in the existence of a regularity and does not require
believing one; hence it cannot require being in the grip of one. Perhaps belief
in the existence of a subsuming regularity can in turn be indirectly explained
in terms of grip, possibly as the disposition to fall into the grip of any regu-
larity which appears to subsume any singular case which is believed. But
I leave on one side this problem for the Humean, and focus only on belief in
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causal generalizations. Of these, there are at least two kinds. There is a kind
which simply summates a number of singular causes, for example:
All the players on the team make their spouse happy.
These are ‘accidental’ (or non-projectible) general causal truths. There is
nothing (I am assuming) about being a player on the team which promotes
making a spouse happy. Given the relation of such generalizations to singu-
lar causal statements, it seems no more appropriate to say that belief in them
requires being in the grip of a regularity than to say the same of any of the
singular causal beliefs they summate. By contrast, there are causal general-
izations which we think of as non-accidental: for example, ‘Dropping wine
glasses makes them break’. In possibly non-Humean terms, the contrast is
that in the accidental cases no causal regularity is specified, not even in a
vague or incomplete way, whereas in the non-accidental cases there is at
least a sketch of a relevant regularity. We can put matters this way only if
we have some adequate conception of a kind of regularity not exemplified
by the regularity that all the players on the team make their spouses happy.
The idea behind the second definition is that Hume can mark the contrast
between these kinds of regularity not in terms of difference of content or
difference of kind of fact affirmed but merely in terms of difference in mode of
belief: to believe in the non-accidental way is to be in the grip of a regularity,
but this is not so for belief in accidents, even when these accidental cases
contain a causal content. (The accidental causal content’s relation to belief can
be addressed only after an account of belief in singular causal statements is in
place.) The grip mode of belief needs to be what is distinctive of non-accidental
generalizations, the other cases involving one or more kinds of non-grip modes
of belief. On this Humean position, the contrast between accidental and non-
accidental generalizations, which at first appeared to be a contrast of content,
is dissolved into a contrast of mode of belief. It is something subjective, in that,
with no cognitive error, the same thing may be believed in the grip way by
some but not all subjects, even if they coincide in informational state; in this
sense the contrast is, as Hume might have put it, ‘in the mind’.
The first phase of the argument is to try to discover a mode in which gen-
eralizations can be believed which does not amount to grip: a non-grip
mode. One could just stipulate some primitive mode, but this would be
unenlightening. Since believing that all Fs are Gs does involve a commit-
ment to believing to be G whatever one believes to be F, we need to have as
much detail as possible about how being in the grip of a regularity is some-
thing more than this. The theme of this section is that the account of the
non-grip mode of belief requires successive enrichments to avoid counter-
examples, and we end up with the second definition. This is not what was
wanted, for it means that the second definition does not, after all, identify a
distinctive mode of belief, the grip mode.
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A first proposal for a non-grip mode of believing that all Fs are G might be:
(1) For all x, S believes that if x is F, then it is G.3
Although universal quantification occurs in both definiens and definition,
there is no circularity relative to the aim of defining general belief, for in the
definition the quantifier lies outside the belief context. The definition looks
quite different from the second definition, so there is a good prospect that
the definitions pick out quite different psychological states: the grip mode
needs to guarantee the presence of a non-grip mode, but not conversely.
However, (1) is not correct, for it is not the case that anyone who believes
any generalization is thereby belief-related to every object in the universe
and believes a singular conditional concerning it. Even if the domain of the
quantifier in the definition is somehow restricted—for example, to just the
objects S encounters—it is still highly implausible to suppose that general
belief requires having so many singular conditional beliefs about wholly
irrelevant objects (non-Fs).
This problem could be addressed by getting the conditional out of the
belief context:
(2) For all x, if S believes that x is F, then S believes that x is G.
This might be without counterexample (i.e. there might be no object S believes
to be F without also believing it to be G) even when S does not believe that all
Fs are Gs, for S believes that there are Fs which are not G. I believe there are
white geraniums, and, being consistent in at least this respect, I do not believe
that all geraniums are red. But all the geraniums I have come across have been
red, so it is true of each thing that if I believe of it that it is a geranium,
I believe of it that it is red. (2) can be true even when S does not believe the
generalization.4
It seems that we need to get some kind of actual or potential transition
into the picture. I can think of two (potentially combinable) ways to achieve
this: by relying on counterfactuals or by relying on causation. One might
improve (2) by modifying it so that the belief that x is F causes the belief that
x is G. In the state envisaged in the previous paragraph, it is arguably false
3 ‘To believe that all men are mortal—what is it? Partly to say so, partly to believe in regard to
any x that turns up that if he is a man he is mortal’ (Ramsey, ‘General propositions and causality’,
136). Ramsey would not approve of the use to which his idea is put here, for he takes ‘All men are
mortal’ to be an example of a non-accidentally true sentence, whereas I use his account in the
search of a non-grip mode of belief. Another difference is that Ramsey will conclude that ‘variable
hypotheticals’ are not really propositions at all. This is a good route for an eliminativist: if beliefs
apparently in a complex content can be reduced to relations between beliefs in a simpler content,
one is free to say that the supposed complex content is unintelligible nonsense, and that the ques-
tion of something satisfying it does not so much as arise.
4 The example can be made transtemporal by supposing that I never have the good fortune to
encounter a white geranium.
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that my believing something to be a geranium causes me to believe it to be
red; so that counterexample would be avoided. But the price is high: the
‘improvement’ would lead to something barely distinguishable from the sec-
ond definition, and so would not be an advisable route to take in the service
of finding a distinct, non-grip mode of belief in generalizations.
This is a route that we will, in the end, be forced to take; but let us first
try instead to bring counterfactuals to bear:
(3) For all x, if S were to come to believe that x is F, then S would come
to believe that x is G.5
This is not right as it stands, for some ways of coming to believe of an object
that it is F are ways of coming to believe of it that it is not G, and these
would typically lead S to abandon the generalization rather than to believe
that the object in question is G (as well as not-G). (3) would wrongly repre-
sent S as not in fact believing that all Fs are Gs. For example, it might be true
that I believe that all the people in the room speak English, but also true that
were a reliable informant to assert something I did not previously believe—
namely, that Pierre is a monolingual Frenchman and is in the room—I
would come to believe that Pierre is in the room but would not go on to
believe that Pierre speaks English. I would change my mind about whether
everyone in the room speaks English. But as things are, I do believe
that everyone in the room speaks English, even though I am not in the state
specified in (3).
Peacocke gestures towards a solution in terms of modes of presentation:
(3) should hold for any object presented under a minimal mode of presenta-
tion like ‘the next one to be encountered’.6 Relating this to the example just
given, the idea is that if Pierre were presented simply as the next person in
the room to be encountered, I would go on to believe that he speaks English.
Any single suggestion of this kind will be inadequate, since if, for example,
one believes that
I’ll never encounter an honest politician (where this equals: all honest
politicians are things I’ll never encounter),
it will not be counterfactually true that were an honest politician presented
under the mode ‘the next one to be encountered’, one would believe that one
will never encounter it.
Fixing up (3) will no doubt involve introducing caveats about what other
information is acquired in the course of coming to believe of something that
it is F: ideally, this information should not itself carry reason to believe
that the object is not G. Such caveats are in any case required by the present
5 Cf. C. Peacocke, ‘Causal modalities and realism’, in M. Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth and
Reality (Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 41–68.
6 Ibid. 55; cf. Ramsey, ‘General propositions and causality’, 136: for ‘any x that turns up’ (cited
above in n. 3).
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formulation of the second definition. All beliefs are defeasible, even those
in the obtaining of generalizations one takes to be non-accidental. One
way in which they can be defeated is by finding a counter instance, an F that
is not a G. That one would abandon belief in a generalization were one to
encounter a counter instance does not show that one does not in fact believe
it. So both the second definition and (3) will need to be supplemented by
some proviso allowing the possibility of coming to disbelieve a generaliza-
tion that one in fact believes. One could add something like the following:
provided that S does not, in coming to believe of x that it is F, come to
believe anything else of x which causes (or would cause) S to believe that x
is not G.
We are now in danger of obliterating any substantive difference between
the grip mode of belief, as characterized in the second definition, and any
other. If we set aside those features of the second definition specially adapted
to events, the difference between it and (3) is just that shown in the follow-
ing skeletons (omitting the envisaged provisos), where p and p range over
singular instances of the generalization in question:
coming to believe that p causes one to come to believe that p;
if one came to believe that p, one would come to believe that p.
I will suggest that each skeleton needs to add the feature of the other which
it lacks: the first skeleton needs to add counterfactual dependence, and the
second needs to add causation. Then the skeletons will converge, and the
difference will well and truly have been obliterated, and thus Hume’s project
will have run into the ground.
In the first skeleton, corresponding to the second definition, ‘causes’
matches ‘determines’, a semantically somewhat mysterious ‘continuous pre-
sent’. The present tense in the definiendum can be taken as ‘Believes (time-
less) at t’; but one can believe some generalization at a time without the
causal transaction the second definition envisages occurring at that time, so
we cannot treat the present tense in ‘determines’ in the same way. If we
interpret the definiens as a quantification over all actual acts (by S) of com-
ing to believe that p, past, present, and future, to the effect that each causes
an act of coming to believe that p, we fail to allow for the fact that one can
believe a generalization today and not tomorrow, in which case one would
(today) believe the generalization while not being in the (transtemporal)
state that the second definition would require. If we interpret the continuous
present (in a way not generally justifiable—but we are trying our best!) as
saying that belief in p has caused belief in p up to now (the time of the belief
in the generalization), the definition is insufficient, since the believer may
have abandoned the belief after the last occasion for the causal transaction.
The second skeleton overcomes this difficulty, in that the time associated
with belief in the generalization can be linked with the time of the believing
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in the definiens. Expanding the skeleton a bit: for all times t, one believes a
certain generalization at t iff if one came to believe at t that p, one would
come to believe at t   that p. This solution is available because a modal
fact can be true at a time when nothing relevant is actually happening. It is
hard to find an interpretation of Hume’s ‘determines’, other than the coun-
terfactual one, which gives the second definition any promise of correctness.
So let us amend it accordingly, taking the new skeleton of the second
definition to be:
(*) if S came to believe that p, this would cause her to come to believe
that p.
The attempt to describe the non-grip mode of belief in a generalization,
using the skeleton ‘if one came to believe that p, one would come to believe
that p’, is inadequate. Believing even an accidental generalization, like ‘All
the coins in my pocket are silver’, requires it to be the case that coming to
believe an instance of the antecedent should potentially produce belief in the
corresponding instance of the consequent. In some actual or counterfactual
circumstance in which I come to believe that this is a coin in my pocket, my
coming to believe that it is silver does not manifest my belief in the general-
ization if it arises independently (e.g. by perception); to manifest my belief
in the generalization, it should be caused by the belief that it is a coin in my
pocket. If we add this causal feature to the earlier counterfactual skeleton,
we get:
(**) if S came to believe that p, this would cause her to come to believe
that p.
This is the same as (*), the skeleton we arrived at when trying to improve
the second definition towards something acceptable. We have converged
from different directions on essentially the same condition. This does not
bode well for the attempt to find substantively different accounts of belief in
grip mode and belief in non-grip mode. However, the modal notions which
have been brought to bear are rich, and it is worthwhile considering other
applications of them, without trying to achieve a simple definition.
V
The hypothesis now to be considered is that to believe in grip mode is to
believe with a high degree of resilience, and to believe in non-grip mode is to
believe with a low degree of resilience. Resilience is a modal notion, and
reflects the likelihood of the subject revising his belief (or revising down-
wards his degree of confidence in it) in the light of potential conflicting
information. Resilience is not the same as degree of confidence or credence,
which is a this-world matter of strength of belief, and could be measured by
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betting quotients. High confidence might combine with low resilience.
Someone in the motor trade assures me that Ford does not make a magenta
car. I believe this with complete confidence (I have no independent informa-
tion and no reason to doubt the word of someone in a position to know).
But I might believe it with low resilience, in that I would abandon it with no
struggle were I to see a Ford-shaped magenta car with the Ford logo. A more
resilient believer would discount the new evidence, supposing that the Ford-
shaped magenta car had been resprayed by an enthusiast or was a Ford
look-alike produced by another manufacturer.
Examples lend some initial plausibility to the identification of grip with
resilience. Consider two responses available to someone who comes to learn
that Mary was at the party, given that the person previously believed both
that everyone at the party got drunk and that Mary is a model of sobriety.
One option is to abandon the generalization, holding to the belief in Mary’s
sobriety. Another is to abandon the belief in Mary as a model of sobriety in
favour of the generalization about the party. What factors might influence
the choice between these revisions? One possible factor is this: if you
supposed it was the kind of party which of its nature ensured that the guests
became drunk, you would be more likely to think that Mary’s sober disposi-
tion had been overstretched, and to retain the opinion that everyone at the
party got drunk; whereas if you supposed it just an accident that those who
got drunk did so, you are more open to the thought that Mary stayed sober,
and that the generalization should be qualified or abandoned. In short, if
you took the generalization to reflect something non-accidental, you
would be less likely to qualify or abandon it were you to be faced by some
potentially defeating evidence than if you took it not to reflect anything
non-accidental.
A Humean distinguishes ‘laws of nature’ from ‘accidental generalizations’
without supposing that there is a difference of content between them. What
we call a statement of a law of nature, like ‘All animals are mortal’, contains
no more ‘nomic content’ than an accidental generalization like ‘Everyone in
the room speaks English’. The difference is not a difference in content, an
implausible view given the invisibility of a relevant semantic difference, but
a widespread difference in mode of belief: laws are believed in grip mode,
that is, resilient mode; accidental generalizations in non-grip mode, that is,
non-resilient mode. If we learn of something we had supposed to be immor-
tal that it is an animal, we will typically revise our belief in its immortality.
If we learn of someone we believe to be in the room that she does not
speak English, we will typically revise our belief in the generalization that
everyone in the room speaks English.
It has been held that the content of a law-statement somehow entails, sus-
tains, or supports a counterfactual, whereas this is not so for the content of
an accidental generalization. A difficulty with such views is that it is hard to
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say in any way at all, let alone a systematic way, what expressions encode
the relevant difference of content. A Humean can mark the difference not as
a difference in content but as a difference in mode of belief, itself reflected in
what resilience counterfactuals are true of typical believers. Strictly, there is
no such thing as being a law or non-accidental generalization, but we call
something a law if it is believed in grip mode by us, or by us and our friends,
or by the experts, or by the majority (the relativization is normally not
determinate).
There is some initial plausibility in the identification of grip with
resilience; but there are also difficulties. Here are some possible counterex-
amples. Suppose I believe that every guest at the party got drunk, but I
regard this as pure accident: I know of nothing about the party which made
it specially conducive to drunkenness. The generalization should be believed
in non-grip mode, and let us suppose that it is in fact thus believed. But sup-
pose I came to this accidental belief by having been present (say as a spy
rather than a guest, so that I can soberly observe without being a counter
instance of the generalization) and having observed every guest get drunk.
Were I to learn that Mary, whom I had supposed a model of sobriety, was
among the guests, I would revise my belief in Mary’s sobriety rather than
abandon the generalization. So a belief held in what ought, for a Humean,
to be non-grip mode might meet a condition for being resilient—that is, for
being held in grip mode. A belief in an accidental generalization may be
resilient because of the way in which it is acquired, and may not reflect a
view of the generalization as non-accidental.7 Other examples suggest the
converse kind of failure: one may have a non-resilient belief in something
one treats as non-accidental; that is, one may regard as non-accidental
something one believes in non-resilient mode. For example, a firm has been
working on alternative unbreakable drinking vessels for wine. I am con-
vinced of their success, know that they are about to drop their prototype
on to concrete, and believe that this occurrence will not be followed by a
breaking. I also believe that dropping wine glasses (vessels made of glass) is
followed by their breaking. This is a causal generalization, and being,
arguably, more than just a summation of singular causal facts, it is the kind
of generalization that I should, and we will suppose do, believe in grip
mode, reflecting my perception of what I believe as something non-accidental.
But were I to come to learn that the dropping of the prototype is in fact the
dropping of a wine glass (the innovation was to develop unbreakable glass),
I would maintain my confidence in the firm, and abandon the belief that all
droppings of wine glasses are followed by breakings. On the present account,
this lack of resilience means that I am not in the grip of a regularity; but this
7 Hume would not regard generalizations all of whose instances had been observed as even can-
didates for being believed with grip. For him, the relevant cases involve inductive projection,
which is what grip sustains.
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is a case of non-accidental belief, and so should be a case of grip. Resilience
is almost never total, for almost all beliefs can be defeated by conflicting
evidence, so we cannot demand that total resilience is what reflects the grip
mode of belief.
Confidence can mimic resilience. In the first counterexample, I am totally
confident in the accidental generalization that every guest at the party was
drunk because I have observed each guest to be drunk, and am well placed
to know that none had escaped my observation. The confidence in this case
held in place the counterfactual that I would be inclined to discount, if not
the new evidence offered (Mary was at the party), at least its impact on the
hypothesis, given previous beliefs. The mechanisms are complex and depend
upon both kind and weight of evidence. Hume was concerned only
with inductive beliefs, ones believed on grounds which do not include
observation of every instance, and inserting this as a restriction of the
subject-matter would help protect his approach. But confidence must still
be separated from resilience, as shown by the example of the magenta Ford.
In the party case, it makes a difference whether the apparent counter evidence
takes the envisaged form, or whether it simultaneously provides an explana-
tion of my mistake. For example, if I were to be told that Mary had been
hiding in a cupboard, so I hadn’t seen her, it is more likely that I would
revise my belief in the generalization.
There is a morass of factors at work in the notions now under discussion
(degrees of confidence, evidence and its weight, and the probabilities of
revision in the light of new information), and it would be of little help to a
Humean to be told that he has a clear thesis only once the issues have been
sorted out. I think, however, that one can sketch a promising direction by
trying to hold as much constant as possible, and by transforming the essen-
tially quantitative notions into qualitative ones. We need to make explicit
the implicit relativity of resilience: just about every belief is resilient to some
but not other potential new information. To call one belief more resilient
than another is a way of saying that one is resilient to ‘more’ information
than another. If the beliefs are different, the comparison will not be straight-
forward, since new information relevant to one may be irrelevant to the
other. Every belief is resilient to irrelevant information, so there is a danger
of incorrect measurement of relative degrees of resilience of distinct beliefs.
In the promising approach, we consider a single belief and a single set of
background beliefs (or a single distribution of subjective probabilities), and
for a series of pieces of potential new information, we ask two questions: is
there a way of holding the belief such that, given this background, it would
be resilient to this information? And is there a way of holding the belief such
that, given this background, it would not be resilient to this information?
Here ‘(believing that p) is resilient to (q)’ means something like: the
probability of the believer revising her belief that p on encountering the
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information that q is low. Those pieces of information for which the answer
to both questions is ‘Yes’ are the ‘sensitive’ ones: one might or might not
revise in the light of them. Given a psychological state of believing, we can
rank its resilience in terms of how many of the sensitive pieces of potential
information it is resilient to: the number of pieces of sensitive information,
those which might cause a revision in belief, those which would not do so.
Finally, we can identify grip mode for that belief with having high resilience,
and non-grip mode with having low resilience. (Or we could rework grip as
a matter of degree, and so claim yet another illusion in the supposition that
there is a difference of kind between the accidental and the non-accidental.)
To show the promise of the approach, I briefly apply it to two of the
problematic examples. There are two ways to believe that every guest at
the party got drunk: one may think of it as an accident, or one may regard the
party as the kind of party which makes drunkenness likely or even inevitable.
The first way of believing is less resilient: there is a piece of information,
that Mary was at the party, coming to learn which would probably lead
one to revise one’s belief about the party, given one’s background confidence
in Mary’s sobriety. The second way of believing is more resilient, for coming
to learn this would probably cause no revision, but would instead cause a
revision in the background belief about Mary’s sobriety, even though this
was held with the same degree of confidence as in the previous case. There
are two ways to believe that glasses break when dropped: I may believe
that this just happens to be so, or I may believe that it is held in place by
causation. In both cases, the belief is not resilient with respect to the potential
information that the firm’s unbreakable drinking vessel is made of glass. But
there is information to which the latter way of believing is resilient and the
former not: for example, seeing a magician drop what appears to be a glass
and it not break. In one case there is a fair chance that the evidence will be
taken at face value and the generalization revised, in the other a fair chance
that it will be discredited and the generalization retained (what appears to
be glass is not always glass).
As the examples reveal, resilience will always be hard to assess definit-
ively, for it involves consideration of potential responses to every piece of
relevant information. But there is nothing circular about an application of
induction here: the fact that this belief is believed with resilience to these
pieces of sensitive information can give reason to believe that it is also
resilient to other, or many more, or even all such pieces of information.
VI
We have come some way from Hume’s second definition, and I close by
estimating this distance. There were two initial Humean hopes: that causal
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belief could be distinguished as a mode of belief rather than as belief
with a distinctive content, and that this could be achieved by the second
definition. The second hope was disappointed, because even belief in an
accidental generalization required the relevant kind of causal and counter-
factual connection between singular beliefs. Since resilience is defined for
beliefs in generalizations, beliefs some of which the second definition was
supposed to define, it is not likely that resilience can be used to produce a
new definition which would look anything like what Hume offered. With
this, many bright consequential hopes have to be abandoned: we can no
longer expect the kind of definition of causal belief which will help a func-
tionalist (or not one who takes it that there is a substantial difference
between grip and non-grip modes); nor can we expect the kind of defini-
tion which will make it straightforward that non-human animals have
such beliefs.8
Despite this, the first hope remains appealing. Recognizing non-accidental,
non-causal beliefs and accidental causal ones, we modified it into the hope
that we could single out distinct modes of belief in terms of which to mark
the distinction between accidental and non-accidental. Thus far, it seems, we
remained more or less within a Humean perspective. But the attempt to
mark this distinction in terms of the modal notion of resilience may seem
both antithetical to Hume’s philosophy and hopelessly circular. It may seem
antithetical, because Hume apparently had no truck with this kind of
modality, and it may seem circular, because the relevant counterfactual facts
themselves involve the concept of the non-accidental.
Hume saw nothing wrong with a kind of necessity and possibility arising
from a comparison of ideas and not considered to hold ‘between the objects
themselves’; this may be approximately equated with a priori necessity and
possibility. On this view, the possible is the coherently thinkable, and this
notion played a pivotal role in his philosophy. The range of worlds involved
in the account of resilience does not exceed the coherently thinkable ones,
but we must restrict our attention to a proper subset of them, those in which
the subject assigns the same subjective probability to all save the target
belief and the newly acquired evidence as to her actual beliefs. Restrictions
like this do not involve a new notion of possibility: we can stipulate that
these are the worlds to be considered, and a ‘comparison of ideas’ can check
whether, for an arbitrary alternative to the actual world, this restriction has
been honoured. The claim that the approach is positively antithetical to
Hume (as opposed merely to being not something one could attribute to
Hume) would need to be based on something more than that it exploits a
modal notion.
8 Though it is not nothing that a development of the second definition will ground an ascrip-
tion of general beliefs to creatures lacking the concept of universal quantification.
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Perhaps we can find the something more in the explanation of the alleged
circularity. The allegation is that the concept of counterfactuality involved
in the concept of resilience itself involves the concept of the non-accidental.
But how does this enter? Not, if the point of the previous paragraph is
accepted, with the notion of a non-actual possibility as such. Perhaps it
enters with the assessment of the likelihood of belief revision in the light of
the envisaged new information. To assess the likelihood, we must bring to
bear knowledge of non-accidental matters, laws relating to the subject’s dis-
positions and psychology. Does this not show that the approach is both
circular and anti-Humean?
Resilience is just a pairing of worlds with a number, a number which mea-
sures the likelihood that the target belief will be abandoned at the paired
world. As such, it contains nothing about psychological laws. But even if it
did, this would not amount to circularity: what is to be defined is belief in
the non-accidental, not the non-accidental as such (though given the char-
acter of the former, there is room for a Humean deflation of the latter). The
structure here is that of the second definition: causation is used in the defin-
ition of causal belief, not in the definition of causation (though, given the
character of the former, there is room for a Humean deflation of the element
of necessity supposedly contained in the latter).
Perhaps there is circularity in that we need beliefs about psychological
laws in order to have evidence for which number measures resilience at a
world. This is the right content for an accusation of circularity, but it falls in
the wrong place. It would be damaging only if this content, belief in the non-
accidental, belonged to the concept of resilience. There is nothing wrong if
it belongs merely to what is involved in possessing evidence for its applica-
tion. Similarly, an analysis of perception which uses causation is not ren-
dered circular by the fact that much, or even all, causal knowledge is based
upon perception.
Hume’s second definition is extraordinary, not only for being a brilliant
answer, but also for being an answer to a brilliant question, one which
Hume thought, correctly as far as I am aware, had never been asked by any
of his predecessors. If the arguments of this paper are accepted, his second
definition is not a correct answer, but the underlying idea that we can dis-
tinguish a distinctive way of believing a generalization, a way which in some
sense puts us in its grip, remains promising, and highly relevant to many
currently debated issues in metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
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